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This  paper  evaluates  the  erosion  of  electoral  accountability  of  the  “Governors”  of  the  Italian 
Regions in three subsequent political moments: 1) the elections; 2) the inaugural speeches of the 
Governor; 3) their first important policy decision, the long-term regional budget (DPEFR). We use 
content analysis (Laver et al., 2003) to assess the position of each Governor on a left to right 
distribution  at the  moment  of  the  inaugural  speeches  and  of  the  DPEFR.  We  then  analyze  the 
correlation between the distributions of 1) the electoral results and the inaugural speeches and 2) the 
inaugural speeches and the DPEFR, under the hypothesis that greater similarity can be interpreted 
as greater accountability. The analysis detects some erosion of accountability from the elections to 
the inaugural speeches, and a more serious one from the inaugural speeches to the DPEFR. A series 
of ANOVA tests suggests that the Region’s relative economic position/dependency on transfers 
from the central governments partly explains such loss of accountability. 
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1. Goals of the analysis 
…You probably wouldn’t, would you?  
In this paper we try to give some empirical evidence to this widespread a priori. Specifically, 
we examine the electoral results, the programmatic speeches and the long-term budget documents 
(Documento di Programmazione Economica e Finanziaria Regionale, DPEFR) of the Presidents of 
the Italian Regions (usually and heretofore called “Governors”) and verify the degree of consistency 
among them. The greater this consistency, the greater the accountability of the Governors, and 
viceversa. We then look at the relative economic conditions of the Regions to verify how they affect 
such accountability.  
Before describing the analysis, three clarifications are in order: the first is about the theoretical 
underpinnings of our inquiry, the second about the methods and the strategy of the analysis, the 
third about the data and the selection of the sample. 
The theoretical literature on the political accountability (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997; 
Persson  and  Tabellini,  2000)  shows  that,  during  a  legislature,  voters  rationally  allow  the 
government  to  appropriate  a  certain  amount  of  “rents  from  holding  office”.  Although  this 
appropriation reduces their welfare, voters still reelect the government, in order to eliminate its 
incentives  to  divert  even  more.  The  extent  to  which  this  erosion  occurs  depends  on  1)  the 
institutional framework in which the principal-agent relationship between voters and representatives 
develops, as presidential systems are characterized by more slack than parliamentary ones; 2) the 
ideological  heterogeneity  of  politicians  competing  for  office,  as  a  high  degree  of  ideological 
polarization makes efficiency no longer the only criterion to evaluate the performance of elected 
politicians (Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2006); 3) the time horizon of the elected officials, whereby 
longer  legislatures  are  characterized  by  lower  electoral  accountability.  In  particular,  Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini (1997) and Lagona and Padovano (2007) show that elected officials enjoy 
greater discretionary power the further away they are from electoral events. We thus expect that an   3 
erosion of the accountability of the Governors of the Italian Regions grows as one moves away 
from their election. The necessary hypothesis that elected officials expect to be voted out of office 
when they do not satisfy the preferences of the majority of the voters is plausible in the context of 
Italian regional politics. First, alternation of governing coalitions has been an actual possibility in 
regional elections since the establishment of the Regions in the 1970s, thus well before that similar 
patterns of replacement took place at the level of national politics. Italian regional politicians have 
always known that they were not sitting on the same political rent that national politicians enjoyed 
for  such  a  long  time  (Putnam,  1993).  Second,  the  1995  reform  of  the  institutions  of  Regional 
Governments introduced a series of provisions that a) greatly increased government stability and b) 
lowered the cost of voting against the incumbent, by eliminating the risk of having a weak and 
unstable  government.  Both  effects  seem  to  have  further  stimulated  alternation  in  government 
(Veronese, 2007). 
In order to verify that this process of progressive erosion of accountability takes place, we 
compare three important moments of regional politics, which are usually included in a six month 
time  span:  1)  the  electoral  results;  2)  the  so  called  inaugural  or programmatic  speeches  of  the 
Governor before the Regional Council (the regional legislature) during the first confidence debate; 
3) the first long term budget document signed by the Governor. The first moment can be taken as 
the expression of voters’ preferences; the second constitutes the first verbal reaction of the elected 
Governor  to  these  preferences;  the  third  is  the  first  important  political  choice  of  the  standing 
government.  Information  about  these  three  moments  has  been  gathered  for  the  two  regional 
legislatures that followed the 1995 institutional reform, the one ensuing the elections that took place 
between 1998 and 2001, and the one after the elections of 2003-2006 (not all Regions celebrate the 
elections at the same time)
1. The available observations for the Italian Regions are then distributed 
                                                 
 
1 A straightforward application of the “Do they walk like the talk?” type of inquiry would classify the DPEFR 
in the talk, rather than walk, dimension, because the DPEFR is essentially a programmatic document. In this respect, a 
better indicator of the walk dimension would be data about the financial and economic performance of the Regional 
governments. At the moment such data are still unavailable, as most observations refer to regional governments elected   4 
on a left to right political dimension. The method of distribution is based on expert evaluations for 
the electoral results; for the programmatic speeches and the long-term budget documents we have 
used the content analysis methodology of Laver et al. (2003). We thus obtain three left to right 
distributions of the Regions, one for each moment. The extent to which the Regions keep their 
relative positions in these three moments is interpreted as a sign of electoral accountability of the 
Governors. The idea is that, in such a case, Governors reflect in their programmatic speeches of the 
confidence  debate  the  preferences  that  voters  expressed  in  the  elections,  and  start  to  program 
policies,  reported  by  the  long-term  budget  documents,  consistent  both  with  the  programmatic 
speeches and with voters’ preferences. Conversely, the more Regions change positions in the three 
moments, the greater the erosion of electoral accountability in the practice of politics.  
Two reasons motivate our choice of the Italian Regions as the sample for this analysis. First, 
content analysis has never been used for Italian regional politics so far. The only application to 
Italian data that we are aware of is Giannetti et al. (2001), to the policy positions of Italian national 
parties. Second, we are interested in verifying whether there is any evidence supporting Putnam’s 
(1993) claims that Italian regional politics is more “responsive”. i.e., accountable, than the national 
one, and that the level of accountability is higher in Northern Regions than in Southern ones.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the politics and 
the institutional context of the Italian Regions. In section 3 we explain the methodology used to 
evaluate  the  policy  positions  of  the  Governors.  Section  4  includes  the  content  analysis  of  the 
Governors’  programmatic  speeches  and  long-term  budget  documents.  Section  5  exploits  this 
information to assess a) to what extent the accountability of the Governors is eroded in the time 
span stemming from the elections, the elected Governor’s programmatic speech and the publication 
                                                                                                                                                                  
between 2005 and 2006. Although a second-best choice, the DPEFRs are still a fairly good indicator of what the 
Regional governments do, because of their strong commitment value vis à vis the Central government. The so called 
Internal Stability and Growth Pact, established between the Italian Central Government and the sub central ones to 
enforce fiscal discipline, works much in the same way as the Stability and Growth Pact between the EU Commission 
and the member countries. The Central Government monitors the policy decisions of the Regional governments on a 
series of documents, among which the DPEFR is the most important, and correlates the transfers to the Regions on the 
discrepancies between the DPEFR and the actual results (Brosio et al. 2003). This stimulates the Regional government 
to publish credible DPEFR and to stick to it as much as possible.   5 
of the long-term budget document, and b) to analyze how this erosion evolves in time and as we 
move  from  one  area  of  the  country  to  another.  Section  6  verifies  to  what  extent  the  relative 
economic  conditions  of  the  Regions  and  their  dependency  on  transfers  from  the  Central 
Government explain the erosion of accountability. In the final section we reassume the main results 
of the analysis and point out the avenues for future research.  
 
2. A brief description of the Italian regional politics 
The Italian Constitution, promulgated in 1948, foresees the principle of decentralization of the 
government functions and the establishment of Regional Governments (Article 5 and Title V of the 
Constitution). Italy has thus been divided in 20 Regions (see appendix B for the list of names and 
abbreviations). Five of them, the first to be established between 1948 and 1963, enjoy a special 
statute (Regioni a Statuto Speciale, or RSS), because of their multilingual status, borderline position 
or particularly low level of development. The remaining 15 Regions characterized by an “ordinary 
statute”  (Regioni  a  Statuto  Ordinario,  or  RSO)  were  established  in  1970,  22  years  after  the 
Constitutional  provision.  Many  Italian  constitutional  lawyers  and  political  scientists  (Lepschy, 
1990; Putnam, 1993; Brosio et al. 2003) argue that the creation of the regional governments in 
1970s constituted a  response to the stalemate in national politics, where the Communist Party, 
which represented more than 1/3 of the electorate, could not participate in government activities 
because of its incompatibility with the Italian set of international alliances. Regional governments 
could provide Communist politicians with a chance to govern certain areas of the country without 
interfering  with  foreign  policy;  at  the  same  time  the  experience  of  administrating  regional 
governments  could  make  Italian  politics  less  extremist,  or,  according  to  Putnam  (1993),  less 
ideology and more administration oriented.  
According to the Constitution, Regional Governments have the major responsibility of health 
care, plus certain aspects of social services, environment, local transportation, housing, culture and   6 
tourism. The difference between the RSO and RSS rests chiefly in the provision of grants from the 
Central Government, which is much more generous for the RSS (Brosio, Maggi and Piperno, 2003).  
Until the early 1990s the institutional framework and the politics of the RSO largely replicated 
those  of  the  National  Government,  being  based  on  proportional  representation  and  on  a 
parliamentary system. This created a lack of accountability and a general dissatisfaction with the 
quality of regional politics. In 1995 a reform was introduced (law n. 43/95) that effectively made 
the regional system of government a presidential one. Government stability was guaranteed by a 
series  of  provisions,  including:  1)  a  top-up  system  ensuring  that  the  absolute  majority  of  the 
legislators is held by the coalition with the relative majority of the votes; 2) a reduction of the 
duration  of  the  Council  (i.e.,  the  Regional  Parliament)  from  five  to  two  years  in  case  of  a  no 
confidence motion is approved during the first two years; 3) a direct election of the Governor, 
starting from 1999 (new art. 122 of the Constitution), who is endowed the power to appoint and 
dismiss the members of the regional Cabinet, unless the Regional Statute disposes otherwise (new 
art. 123 of the Constitution). These provisions belong to a larger package of reform of Title V of the 
Italian Constitution, which disciplines the lower levels of government and has generally increased, 
among other things, the administrative and legislative competencies of the Regions (Fiorino and 
Ricciuti, 2007).  
This reform considerably affected the ways and mores of Italian regional politics. Alternation in 
government,  already  present,  significantly  increased  in  the  two  elections  held  under  the  new 
institutional system.  In  the last electoral round, 8 regions out of 20 (Abruzzo, Calabria, Friuli, 
Lazio,  Liguria,  Piemonte,  Puglia  and  Sardegna)  swung  from  the  center-right  to  the  center-left 
coalition, a remarkable shift given the traditional stability of Italian politics. The direct election of 
the Governor also prompted the adoption of new practices usually featured in accountable systems 
of government, like the publishing of electoral programs (although still by a few candidates, 12 out 
of 80 for the last two rounds of elections); the deliverance, by the Governor, of a programmatic   7 
speech before the Regional Council in coincidence of the first confidence debate that marks the 
investiture of the Regional Government; the adoption of long term budget documents, as well as 
other initiatives in the same vein. The present analysis exploits some of these innovations.  
 
3. Methodology 
To  evaluate  the  policy  position  of  the  Governors  of  the  Regions  at  the  stage  of  their 
programmatic speeches and of the approval of the first DPEFRs of the legislature we adopt the a 
priori methodology of Laver et al. (2003). This methodology is based on a comparison of two sets 
of political texts: one, the so-called “reference texts”, is constituted by texts whose policy positions 
on well-defined, a priori policy dimensions are known to and chosen by the analyst; the second, the 
so-called “virgin texts”, is composed by texts whose policy positions must instead be found out. 
Specifically, this methodology uses the relative frequency for each of the different words in each of 
the reference texts to calculate the probability of reading a particular reference text given that a 
particular word is found in the virgin text. For a specific a priori policy dimension, which the 
analyst chooses by selecting the reference texts in ways that we shall describe below, this procedure 
generates a numerical score for each word. The sum of the word scores is the expected policy 
position of any virgin text in the policy dimension spanned by the reference texts. In the case a 
virgin text is identical to a reference text, the word score is at the maximum value, because the 
probability of reading the same text is equal to 1. The less similar the virgin text is to the reference 
text, the lower will be the score. 
In other words, the word scores generated from the reference texts are used to estimate the 
positions the virgin texts on the policy dimension in which the analyst is interested. Each word in a 
virgin text provides a small amount of information about which of the reference texts the virgin text 
most closely resembles. This produces a conditional expectation of the virgin text’s policy position 
and each scored word in a virgin text adds to this information. This procedure can be though of as a   8 
type of Bayesian reading of the virgin text with the estimates of the policy position of the any given 
virgin text being updated each time one reads a word that is also found in one of the reference texts. 
The more scored words are read, the more confident one becomes with the estimates.   
The selection of an appropriate set of reference texts is clearly a crucial aspect of this a priori 
approach. As Laver et al. (2003) point out, “…the hard and fast rule when selecting reference texts 
is that we must have access to confident estimates of, or assumptions about, their position on the 
policy dimension under investigation” (p. 314). Additionally, Laver et al. (2003) offer three further 
guidelines in the selection of reference texts: 
1)  They should use the same lexicon, in the same context, as the virgin text being analyzed; for 
example,  party  manifestos  should  not  be  considered  as  appropriate  reference  texts  for 
analyzing legislative speeches; 
2)  The policy position of the reference texts should span the dimension in which the analyst is 
interested;  ideally,  they  should  occupy  extreme  positions  of  the  dimension  under 
investigation; 
3)  The set of reference texts should contain as many different words as possible. The more 
comprehensive this word universe, and thus the less often one finds words in virgin texts that 
do not appear in any reference text, the better. Reference texts should then be both long 
documents; documents of unequal length create statistical problems, inasmuch as they reduce 
the possibility to make confident inferences about the policy positions of virgin texts.  
 
4. Content analysis 
Data availability is, at the same time, an innovative aspect of and a constraint for this inquiry. 
As the first systematic analysis of the speeches of the Governors of the Italian Regions to adopt the 
content analysis, the gathering of the data set constitutes per se an innovative aspect of the inquiry
2. 
                                                 
 
2 See Appendix A for the illustration of the data sources.   9 
On the other hand, several circumstances have limited the extension of the data set. First, we could 
not  examine  electoral  manifestos  because  only  12  candidates  to  the  Governorship  out  of  80 
published such documents. We thus focused our attention on the programmatic speeches that the 
elected  Governors  deliver  before  the  Regional  Council  upon  the  investiture  of  the  regional 
government. We have collected a total of 29 inaugural speeches (out of a maximum possible of 40) 
delivered at the beginning of the VII and VIII Regional Legislatures, the two that followed the 1995 
institutional  reform.  The  remaining  11  speeches  were  either  not  delivered,  or  have  not  been 
recorded. All in all, we have scored the speeches for Abruzzo (VIII legislature), Basilicata (VII and 
VIII), Calabria (VII and VIII), Campania (VIII), Emilia Romagna (VII and VIII), Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia (VII), Lazio (VII and VIII), Liguria (VII), Lombardia (VIII), Marche (VII and VIII), Molise 
(VIII), Piemonte (VII and VIII), Puglia (VIII), Sardegna (VIII), Sicilia (VII), Trentino Alto-Adige 
(VIII), Toscana (VII and VIII), Umbria (VII), Valle d’Aosta (VII and VIII), Veneto (VII and VIII)
3.  
Information about the DPEFRs is even more limited, because not all Regional Governments 
publish  these  documents  and  we  need  only  those  of  the  Regions  for  which  we  have  the 
programmatic  speeches  too.  The  total  amounts  to  just  19  DPEFRs,  namely,  Abruzzo  (VIII 
legislature), Basilicata (VII), Campania (VIII), Emilia Romagna (VII and VIII), Lazio (VII and 
VIII), Lombardia (VIII), Marche (VIII), Molise (VIII), Piemonte (VIII), Sardegna (VIII), Sicilia 
(VII), Trentino Alto-Adige (VIII), Toscana (VII and VIII), Umbria (VII), Veneto (VII and VIII). 
All of the DPEFRs were the first ones published by the elected Regional Government, in order to 
make the temporal distance between the three moments as tight as possible.  
Concerning the left-to-right political dimension of the inaugural speeches and of the DPEFR, we 
use a combination of the electoral results and the other guidelines suggested by Laver et al. (2003) 
as our a priori criterion in the selection of the reference texts. This allows avoiding a double use of 
the electoral results in the selection of the reference texts and in the accountability analysis, where 
                                                 
 
3 For one legislature of Sardegna and Emilia Romagna we have actually used the electoral program and not the 
programmatic speech, because instead the programmatic speech was in fact a repetition of the electoral program.   10 
they proxy the voters’ preferences. In particular, the consideration of a) the availability of the texts 
of both the speeches and the DPEFRs and b) of the length requirement of the documents lead us to 
select the programmatic speeches of the Governors of Basilicata (VIII legislature) and of Sicilia 
(VII legislature) as the reference texts for the center-left (Ulivo) and center-right (Polo) coalition, 
respectively
4. They are given the values of –1 and + 1, respectively. The same criterion is applied to 
the selection of the reference texts for the DPEFRs. In this case, the DPEFRs of Piemonte (VIII 
legislature, center-left) and Sicily (VII, center-right) are the reference texts, with an assigned score 
of –1 and +1.  
Table 1 reports the percentage of votes of the winning coalitions of the regional elections for the 
legislatures under consideration, using the standard left-to-right dimension. Table 2 illustrates the 
results of the content analysis for the left-to-right dimension of the programmatic speeches; finally, 
Table 3 contains the information about the content analysis of the DPEFRs.  
                                                 
 
4 For example, if one had considered only the electoral results in the choice of the reference texts, the speeches 
selected would have been those of Lombardy VIII on the rightist end because of the high number of votes received by 
the Northern League in that Region; and of Puglia VIII on the leftist end because the elected Governor, Nicky Vendola, 
is a member of the Party of Communist Refoundation. These two speeches were, however, of very unequal length (2808 
words versus 14373), which makes them quite unsuitable candidates to benchmarking the “leftist” and the “rightist” 
discourse.    11 
Table 1. Results of regional elections 
2000  2005  Region 
Centre-left  Centre-right  Centre-left  Centre-right 
Abruzzo    49.26  57.8   
Basilicata  63.0    67.0   
Calabria    49.8  59.0   
Campania  54.18    61.6   
Emilia Romagna  54.1    62.7   
Friuli Venezia Giulia.    52.0
*  53.17
***   
Liguria    50.1  52.64   
Lombardia    62.37    53.4 
Lazio    51.5  50.7   
Marche  49.1    57.7   
Molise    58.0    54.0
****** 
Piemonte    51.8  50.9   
Puglia    54.0  49.7   
Sardegna    43
**  50.2
*****   
Sicilia    59.1
****    53.08 
Toscana  48.7    56.7   
Umbria  55.7    63.01   
Veneto    55.0    55.0 
 
Electoral results for Valle d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige are not reported because the elected local parties do not 
follow the usual left-right spectrum of Italian politics. 
 
NOTES 
* Elections held in 1998. 
** Elections held in 1999. 
*** Elections held in 2003. 
****Elections held in 2001. 
***** Elections held in 2004. 
****** Elections held in 2006. 
  
Table 2. Word scoring of the programmatic speeches, political dimension 
Reference texts: BAS VIII (-1) and SIC VII (+1) 






Transformed 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Total Words Scored  % of Total 
Words Scored 
1  ABR VIII    0,06  0,01  1.076  3,61  0,30  3,00  4,22  5.918  84,3 
2  BAS VII  -0,05  0,00  2.446  -2,39  0,20  -2,80  -1,98  13.273  88,9 
3  CAL VII  0,00  0,01  743  0,05  0,51  -0,98  1,07  1.945  85,5 
4  CAL VIII  -0,01  0,01  965  -0,28  0,43  -1,13  0,58  2.992  86,6 
5  CAM VIII   0,01  0,01  604  0,61  0,50  -0,40  1,62  1.934  90,6 
6  ERO VII  -0,01  0,01  1.192  -0,22  0,31  -0,85  0,40  4.844  88,9 
7  ERO VIII   -0,02  0,01  1.422  -0,90  0,28  -1,46  -0,35  6.173  90,5 
8  FVG VII  -0,01  0,00  1.467  -0,59  0,26  -1,12  -0,07  6.645  86,1 
9  LAZ VII  0,04  0,01  1.424  2,27  0,30  1,66  2,87  5.866  84,5 
10 LAZ VIII  0,04  0,01  710  2,15  0,51  1,13  3,17  2.058  88,2 
11 LIG VII  0,00  0,00  1.997  0,40  0,22  -0,04  0,84  11.372  87,9 
12 LOM VIII     0,01  0,01  834  0,59  0,43  -0,27  1,46  2.808  90,1 
13 MAR VII  0,02  0,01  1.040  1,01  0,33  0,35  1,67  4.347  87,7 
14 MAR VIII   -0,04  0,01  1.336  -2,05  0,27  -2,59  -1,50  5.964  88,1 
15 MOL VIII  -0,03  0,00  2.068  -1,28  0,24  -1,75  -0,80  9.234  86,9 
16 PIE VII  0,03  0,01  1.250  1,54  0,34  0,86  2,21  4.848  85,9 
17 PIE VIII  -0,02  0,01  854  -0,76  0,41  -1,57  0,06  2.779  88,2 
18 PUG VIII   -0,03  0,00  2.474  -1,69  0,19  -2,07  -1,31  14.373  87,8 
19 SAR VIII  -0,02  0,00  3.275  -0,94  0,13  -1,19  -0,69  31.179  87,9 
20 TAA VIII  -0,01  0,01  1.259  -0,29  0,32  -0,92  0,35  5.133  86,9 
21 TOS VII  0,00  0,01  994  0,12  0,38  -0,64  0,87  3.690  86,5 
22 TOS VIII  -0,01  0,01  888  -0,31  0,40  -1,10  0,49  3.400  89,3 
23 UMB VII  0,01  0,01  1.460  0,91  0,29  0,34  1,49  6.287  89,1 
24 VDA VII  -0,04  0,01  882  -1,90  0,41  -2,71  -1,08  2.876  90,7 
25 VDA VIII  -0,03  0,01  578  -1,27  0,55  -2,38  -0,16  1.549  88,1 
26 VEN VII  0,00  0,01  950  0,31  0,43  -0,54  1,17  2.942  89 
27 VEN VIII  0,02  0,01  1.062  1,21  0,38  0,45  1,98  3.626  85,6   13 
Table 3. Word scoring of the DPEFRs, political dimension 
Reference texts: PIE VIII (-1) and SIC VII (+1) 
N.  Virgin Text  Raw Score  Raw SE  Unique Scored Words  Transformed Score  Transformed  
Standard Errors 
Transformed 95%  
Confidence Interval 
Total Words  
Scored 
% of Total  
Words scored 
1  ABR VIII    -0,05  0,00  5289,00  -0,16  0,03  -0,21  -0,11  72963,00  92,70 
2  BAS VII  -0,10  0,01  1498,00  -0,98  0,08  -1,15  -0,81  5678,00  85,20 
3  CAM VIII  -0,03  0,00  3016,00  0,13  0,05  0,03  0,23  21139,00  92,40 
4  ERO VII  -0,06  0,00  4956,00  -0,40  0,03  -0,45  -0,34  57231,00  88,90 
5  ERO VIII  -0,10  0,00  3681,00  -0,94  0,04  -1,02  -0,87  28704,00  92,00 
6  LAZ VII  -0,03  0,00  5116,00  0,15  0,02  0,10  0,19  74701,00  86,80 
7  LAZ VIII  0,27  0,00  4429,00  4,86  0,03  4,79  4,92  70181,00  90,30 
8  LOM VIII  -0,13  0,00  3829,00  -1,46  0,03  -1,51  -1,40  49171,00  88,60 
9  MAR VIII  -0,04  0,00  5500,00  0,03  0,02  -0,02  0,08  79970,00  90,00 
10 MOL VIII  0,00  0,00  3580,00  0,55  0,04  0,46  0,63  27164,00  90,20 
11 SAR VIII  -0,01  0,00  5389,00  0,39  0,03  0,34  0,44  76958,00  90,50 
12 SIC VIII  -0,08  0,01  1118,00  -0,63  0,11  -0,84  -0,42  3875,00  89,60 
13 TOS VII  -0,11  0,00  2852,00  -1,25  0,04  -1,33  -1,16  20405,00  91,90 
14 TOS VIII  -0,12  0,00  3298,00  -1,27  0,04  -1,35  -1,19  24591,00  94,02 
15 UMB VII  -0,01  0,00  5073,00  0,38  0,03  0,33  0,43  70031,00  89,60 
16 VEN VII  -0,05  0,00  6389,00  -0,25  0,02  -0,28  -0,21  157386,00  89,50 
17 VEN VIII  -0,03  0,00  6637,00  0,18  0,02  0,15  0,22  177195,00  88,70 
 
  
5. Evaluation of political accountability 
The application of the methodology of Laver et al. (2003) to the programmatic speeches 
of the Governors of the Italian Regions seems to give satisfactory results. The comparison 
between Table 1 and the column of the transformed scores in Table 2 shows that twenty-three 
“virgin”  speeches  out  of  twenty-seven  are  consistent  with  the  electoral  results.  The 
methodology of content analysis of the speeches captures the right to left swing of Calabria 
and  Piemonte,  as  well as  the  movements  further  to  the  left  of  the  electorate  of  Toscana, 
Marche and Emilia Romagna. Lazio, instead, underwent a swing from a centre-right to a 
centre-left  coalition  that  is  not  reflected  in  the  transformed  scores.  The  scores  are  also 
consistent with the electoral results of BasilicataVII, Friuli VII, Liguria VII, Lombardia VIII, 
Puglia VIII, Sardegna VIII, Veneto VII and VIII. Also for Val d’Aosta VII and VIII and for 
Trentino VIII, the two Regions where the local parties are not immediately identifiable with 
the national ones, the transformed scores are in line with the political orientation of the local 
parties. However, in the cases of Abruzzo VIII, Campania VIII, Molise VIII and Umbria VII 
the electoral results do not find correspondence in the evaluation of the speeches. Yet, it must 
be kept in mind that these four cases may reflect a genuine movement of the Governor away 
from the political orientation of his (or her, in the case of Umbria) electorate.  
Finally, also the transformed scores assigned to the DPEFR expose a departure from the 
electoral results. Of the seventeen DPEFRs scored, nine do not coincide with the political 
orientation expressed by voters: Abruzzo VIII, Lazio VIII, Lombardia VIII, Marche VIII, 
Molise VIII, Sardegna VIII, Sicilia VII, Umbria VII, and Veneto VIII. It seems that, once the 
financial needs must be confronted, the ideological positions of the Governors loose relevance 
or, at least, diminish in intensity.  
In order to provide a quantitative assessment of the loss of accountability of the Governors 
as the political act moves from the electoral results to the establishment of the government 
and to the programming of policies, we resort to a Spearman correlation index of the rankings   19 
of the Regions in the three moments considered. The number of observations does not allow 
enough degrees of freedom to perform regression analysis.  
The ranking of the Regions according to the electoral results was obtained by assigning 
negative values to the percentage of votes obtained by centre-left coalitions, so to obtain a 
left-to-right  scaling  of  the  Regions  comparable  to  those  of  the  transformed  scores  of  the 
speeches and of the DPEFRs. The value for the Spearman rho correlating the rankings of the 
electoral results and of the transformed scores of the programmatic speeches is 0.352 (26 
observations, p value = 0.076), which is statistically significant but not very high. This can be 
taken as evidence of a loss of electoral accountability from the moment of the electoral results 
to that of the programmatic speeches. The value of the Spearman index between the speeches 
and the DPEFRs is 0.326 (19 observations, p value = 0.173), lower than the rho for the ranks 
of the electoral results and the speeches and not statistically significant. This implies that the 
left-to-right distributions of the Regions at the moment of the inaugural speeches and of the 
DPEFRs are not correlated. Thus, the comparison of the values of these indexes shows that 
some loss of political accountability of the Governors takes place moving from the stage of 
the electoral results to that of the programmatic speeches, but an even larger erosion appears 
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Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the evolution of the positions taken by the Regions in the moment 
of the electoral results (vertical axis to the left), of the programmatic speech (vertical axis in 
the middle) and of the DPEFRs (vertical axis to the right). Following Laver and Garry (2000) 
we normalize the left-to-right political dimension of the electoral results to a scale correlated 
to  that  of  the  reference  texts  for  the programmatic  speeches.  By  that,  the  most  left-wing 
Region is assigned a score equal to -1, the most right wing Region a score of +1, while the 
scores for all other Regions are normalized in a linear fashion. These values are reported on 
the vertical axis on the left. The values reported on the other two axes are, instead, the same   22 
transformed  scores  of  Tables  2  and  3.  Furthermore,  we  report  information  only  for  the 
Regions for which we have information for all the three moments (balanced samples). Finally, 
to gauge some evidence of how the process evolves through time, we have separated the 
values for the VII legislature (reported in Figure 1, seven Regions) from those of the VIII 
legislature (reported in Figure 2, eleven Regions). Straight lines indicate perfect consistency 
between the scores that a Region obtains in each moment, which is evidence of electoral 
accountability. Angles, instead, denote changes of position, thus lower consistency between 
the three moments, which is evidence of lower electoral accountability.  
The  Figures provide  three  interesting  results.  Firstly,  contrary  to  what  Putnam  (1993) 
declares to find in his analysis of Italian regional politics in the 1970s and the 1980s, there is 
no evidence of a North-South pattern in the degree of accountability. Figure 1 shows that 
Sicily VII is almost a perfectly straight line, whilst the sharpest changes of scores are those of 
Basilicata VII and Lazio VII. But even Veneto VII and Emilia Romagna VII, the two most 
Northern Regions featured in Figure 1, are characterized by noticeable angles. Figure 2, about 
the  VIII  legislature,  reveals  remarkable  changes  of  position  of  Lazio,  Abruzzo  and 
Lombardia; on the contrary, Piemonte (in the North) and Sardegna (in the South) describe 
almost straight lines, i.e., no change of scores. 
The distribution of these changes does not seem to be systematically influenced by the 
partisanship of the Governor. In the VII Legislature the centre-right coalition held 67% of the 
analysed  Regions,  but  was  responsible  for  only  25%  of  the  major  changes  of  position 
illustrated in Figure 1, and could therefore be interpreted as being more accountable than the 
centre-left  coalition.  In  the  VIII  Legislature  the  positions  are  reversed:  the  centre-right 
coalition held only 22% of the analysed Regions, but was responsible for 33% of the major 
changes illustrated in Figure 2, a sign of lower relative accountability.  
Thirdly, a comparison between the Figures immediately exposes that the VIII legislature 
is characterized by much more remarkable changes of position than the VII. There is thus   23 
evidence  that  accountability  is  further  eroded  as  we  move  away  from  the  time  of  the 
institutional reforms of 1995. We acknowledge that just two legislatures cannot be taken as 
conclusive  evidence,  but  the  pattern  recorded  is  certainly  worrying  as  far  as  electoral 
accountability, one of the main goals of the 1995 reforms, is concerned. It is to be noted that 
the reform of the Title V of the Italian Constitution was enacted in 2001, namely, between the 
two  legislatures  under  scrutiny.  This  reform  increased  the  competencies  (art.  117)  and 
financial autonomy (art. 119) of the Regions, but so far only the spending side of the reform 
has found application. The resulting common pool is possibly an explanation of the lower 
accountability detected in Legislature VIII relative to Legislature VII. In other words, the 
practice, if not the principles, of the Constitutional Reform of 2001 has gone against the 
institutional reform of 1995.  
 
6. Erosion of accountability and financial constraints 
The Italian Regions are heavily dependent on transfers from the Central government to 
finance their spending decisions and policy programs. Between 1997 and 2005, i.e., in the 
time period of the two legislatures that we have analyzed, the ratio of own resources to the 
total  revenues  averaged  around  0.45  for  the  whole  20  Italian  Regions,  with  a  standard 
deviation of 0.17 (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2007). As these transfers are by and 
large negatively correlated with regional income levels, the dependency on transfers mirrors 
the economic conditions in which Regional governments operate. This dependency therefore 
captures  probably  the  most  important  constraint  on  the  Governors’  ability  to  keep  their 
electoral  promises  (and  a  usual  excuse  for  failing  to  do  so),  namely,  the  availability  of 
financial  resources  transferred  from  the  Center.  We  then  verify  whether  the  erosion  of 
electoral  accountability  discussed  in  the  previous  section  depends  on  these  economic 
constraints or on political determinants. To this end, we evaluate the inaugural speeches of the 
Governors and the DPEFRs along an economic dimension, based on the dependence of each   24 
Region on the Central Government. We then perform a series of ANOVA tests to gauge 
whether the discrepancies between 1) the electoral results and the inaugural speeches and 2) 
the inaugural speeches and the DPEFRs are best explained by ideological differences or by 
the dependency on grants.  
For the analysis of the content of the inaugural speeches we use, as reference texts, the 
speeches of the most and least dependent Region that, again, are long enough and comparable 
in length. Based on these criteria we select Marche VIII for low dependency (assigned score –
1) and Molise VIII legislature for high dependency (assigned score +1). Table 4 reports the 
results.  Two  are  the  most  interesting  for  our  purposes.  First,  the  transformed  scored  are 
entirely consistent with the ranking of the Regions from the most to the least dependent on 
grants. All speeches of Governors of high dependent Regions show a positive transformed 
score, i.e., they are more similar to the speech of Molise VIII. Conversely, all the negative 
scores refer to Regions that are in the bottom half of the ranking for dependency on grants and 
are therefore more similar to the speech of Marche VII. Second, along this dimension we do 
not observe any switch from a positive to a negative sign (or vice versa), even in cases of 
Regions  that  underwent  a  swing  in  the  electoral  results.  This  is  consistent  with  the  high 
resilience of the economic conditions of the Italian Regions. Similar remarks can be made for 
the results of the analysis of the DPEFRs (Table 5), with the only difference that the reference 
text for the least dependent Region is Marche VIII; no DPEFR was published in that Region 
for the VII
th legislature. 
These results are used to inform our ANOVA tests, whose results are reported in Tables 6-
7 for the inaugural speeches and Tables 8-9 for the DPEFRs.  
  
Table 4. Word scoring of the programmatic speeches, economic dimension 
Reference texts: MAR VII (-1) and MOL VIII (+1) 
N.  Virgin Text  Raw Score  Raw Standard Error  Unique Scored 
Words 
Transformed Score  Transformed 
Standard Error 
Transformed 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Total Words Scored  % of Total 
Words Scored 
1  ABR VIII  -0,05  0,01  812  -3,12  0,20  -3,53  -2,72  5.497  78,3 
2  BAS VII  0,11  0,00  1.658  1,57  0,14  1,30  1,85  11.913  79,8 
3  BAS VIII  0,12  0,00  1.897  2,03  0,11  1,80  2,25  18.244  80,7 
4  CAL VII  0,09  0,01  594  0,94  0,36  0,22  1,66  1.770  77,8 
5  CAL VIII  0,08  0,01  767  0,81  0,29  0,23  1,40  2.745  79,4 
6  CAM VIII  0,06  0,01  491  0,28  0,37  -0,46  1,01  1.759  82,4 
7  ERO VII  0,00  0,01  965  -1,67  0,22  -2,11  -1,22  4.572  83,9 
8  ERO VIII  0,05  0,01  1.086  -0,14  0,20  -0,54  0,27  5.672  83,1 
9  FVG VII  0,09  0,01  1.157  0,94  0,19  0,56  1,32  6.235  80,8 
10  LAZ VII  0,04  0,01  1.085  -0,39  0,21  -0,81  0,03  5.377  77,5 
11  LAZ VIII  0,04  0,01  589  -0,49  0,35  -1,19  0,21  1.906  81,7 
12  LIG VII  0,05  0,01  1.487  -0,07  0,15  -0,38  0,24  10.528  81,4 
13  LOM VIII  0,04  0,01  683  -0,41  0,29  -0,99  0,18  2.611  83,8 
14  MAR VIII  0,06  0,01  1.089  0,19  0,20  -0,21  0,58  5.697  84,2 
15  PIE VII  0,04  0,01  963  -0,39  0,23  -0,86  0,07  4.465  79,1 
16  PIE VIII  0,03  0,01  720  -0,61  0,30  -1,21  -0,02  2.622  83,2 
17  PUG VIII  0,11  0,00  1.678  1,61  0,13  1,35  1,87  12.952  79,1 
18  SAR VIII  0,10  0,00  2.173  1,51  0,09  1,33  1,69  28.494  80,3 
19  SIC VII  0,06  0,01  991  0,08  0,24  -0,39  0,56  4.267  79,2 
20  TAA VIII  0,06  0,01  971  0,17  0,23  -0,28  0,63  4.641  78,6 
21  TOS VII  0,01  0,01  833  -1,42  0,27  -1,95  -0,88  3.480  81,6 
22  TOS VIII  -0,04  0,01  718  -2,78  0,27  -3,32  -2,24  3.182  83,5 
23  UMB VII  0,05  0,01  1.134  -0,14  0,20  -0,54  0,26  5.832  82,6 
24  VDA VII  0,18  0,01  718  3,72  0,29  3,13  4,31  2.634  83,0 
25  VDA VIII  0,06  0,01  489  0,32  0,40  -0,48  1,12  1.440  81,9 
26  VEN VII  0,05  0,01  764  -0,23  0,29  -0,82  0,36  2.711  82,0 
27  VEN VIII  0,03  0,01  822  -0,80  0,27  -1,34  -0,27  3.311  78,1   26 
Table 5. Word scoring of the DPEFRs, economic dimension 
Reference texts: MAR VIII (-1) and MOL VIII (+1) 
N.  Virgin Text  Raw Score  Raw SE  Unique Scored Words  Transformed Score  Transformed SE  Transformed 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Total Words Scored  % Tot Sc'd 
1  ABR VIII  -0,06  0,00  5,54  0,16  0,14  -0,12  0,43  73,67  93,60 
2  BAS VII  -0,07  0,01  1,60  -0,72  0,49  -1,70  0,26  6,28  86,80 
3  CAM VIII  -0,04  0,00  3,15  1,53  0,26  1,02  2,05  21,40  93,50 
4  ERO VII  -0,07  0,00  5,37  -0,82  0,15  -1,12  -0,51  62,55  91,20 
5  ERO VIII  -0,06  0,00  3,83  -0,13  0,21  -0,55  0,28  29,98  93,00 
6  LAZ VII  -0,05  0,00  5,65  0,71  0,13  0,44  0,98  80,66  89,60 
7  LAZ VIII  -0,02  0,00  4,70  3,63  0,14  3,36  3,90  71,53  92,00 
8  LOM VIII  -0,08  0,00  4,03  -2,31  0,16  -2,64  -1,98  49,95  89,60 
9  PIE VIII  -0,08  0,00  4,69  -1,84  0,18  -2,20  -1,47  43,13  92,70 
10  SAR VIII  -0,06  0,00  5,68  0,03  0,14  -0,25  0,30  77,74  91,40 
11  SIC VII  -0,05  0,00  4,47  1,45  0,19  1,07  1,83  41,01  91,00 
12  TAA VIII  -0,05  0,01  1,14  0,71  0,62  -0,54  1,95  3,92  90,60 
13  TOS VII  -0,07  0,00  3,38  -0,71  0,23  -1,17  -0,25  24,76  94,80 
14  TOS VIII  -0,07  0,00  3,38  -0,71  0,23  -1,17  -0,25  24,76  94,80 
15  UMB VII  -0,06  0,00  5,46  0,17  0,14  -0,10  0,45  75,02  92,40 
16  VEN VII  -0,07  0,00  6,84  -0,90  0,10  -1,09  -0,71  158,98  90,40 
17  VEN VIII  -0,07  0,00  7,25  -1,29  0,09  -1,47  -1,11  179,60  89,90   27 
Table 6. Transformed scores of Table 2, inaugural speeches  
Ideological dimension  Economic dimension 
Center-right Region =1  Mean  N.  Std. Deviation  Transfer dependent Region =1  Mean  N.  Std. Deviation 
0,00  -0.164  14  1.62529  0,00  0.6264  14  1.2817 
1,00  0.36  10  1.11035  1,00  -0.6815  13  1.26342 
Total  0.1404  24  1.41825  Total  -0.0033  27  1.41479 
 
 
Table 7. ANOVA output, inaugural speeches 
Ideological dimension  Economic dimension 

























0.827  1  0.827  0.4  0.533  Between 
groups 
(combined) 
11.532  1  11.532  7.117  0.013 
Within 
groups 
45.436  22  Within 
groups 
40.511  25  1.62     
Right-left 
transformed 
scores  of 
Table  2  × 
Right=1  if 
Region 
center-right 
coalition  is 
in power 
Total  46.423  23 
2.065     
Right-left 
transformed 
scores  of 
Table  2  × 
Transfer 
dependent=1 
if  Region 
has  a 
positive 
transformed 
score  in 
Table 4 
Total  52.043  26       
   28 
Table 8. Transformed scores of Table 3, DPEFRs 
Ideological dimension  Economic dimension 
Center-right Region =1  Mean  N.  Std. Deviation  Transfer dependent Region =1  Mean  N.  Std. Deviation 
0,00  -0.0175  12  1.65516341  0,00  -0.384167  12  0.68314059 
1,00  -0.065714  7  0.80810183  1,00  0.562857  7  2.03981792 
Total  -0.035263  19  1.37565487  Total  -0.035263  19  1.37565487 
 
 
Table 9. ANOVA output, DPEFRs 
Ideological dimension  Economic dimension 

























3.9284  7  0.5612  0.2  0.9773  Between 
groups 
(combined) 
2.9182  7  0.4169  0.15  0.991 
Within 
groups 
30.1352  11  Within 
groups 
31.1455  11  2.8314     
Right-left 
transformed 
scores  of 
Table  2  × 
Right=1  if 
center-right 
coalition  is 
in power 
Total  34.0637  18 
2.7396     
Right-left 
transformed 
scores  of 
Table  2  × 
Transfer 
dependent=1 
if  Region 
has  a 
positive 
transformed 
score  in 
Table 4 
Total  34.0064  18       
  
Table  6  reports  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  transformed  scores  of  Table  2  and  4, 
reporting the content analysis of the inaugural speeches along, respectively, the ideological 
and the economic dimension. In the left hand columns, Regions are assigned a value of 0 if 
governed by a center-left coalition, and 1 otherwise; in the right hand columns a value of 0 is 
assigned  to  Regions  characterized  by  a  low  dependency  on  grants  (i.e.,  with  a  negative 
transformed score in Table 4) and a value of 1 to Regions highly dependent on grants (i.e., 
with a positive transformed score in Table 4).  
Table 7 is the ANOVA output performed on these ideological and economic distributions. 
There appears to be no significant difference between the speeches of center-left Governors 
and those of center-right Governors: the F statistics of 0.4 in the left hand side of Table 6 is 
not  statistically  significant  (p-value  of  0.53).  There  is,  however,  a  significant  difference 
between the speeches of Governors of transfer-dependent Regions and those of Governors of 
less dependent regions: the F statistics of 7,117 in the right hand side of the table is significant 
at 1% level. This implies that Regions that are relatively more dependent on transfers from the 
Central government tend to have a more “leftist” discourse and vice versa
5. In other words, 
the economic and financial conditions of the Region do affect the programmatic speech of the 
Governor and thus explain, to an extent that the ANOVA methodology cannot estimate, the 
erosion of accountability from the moment of the electoral results to that of the inaugural 
speeches. To further confirm this result, Figure 3 plots the transformed scores of the Regions 
for the ideological dimension (horizontal axis) and the economic dimension (vertical axis). It 
reveals a negative correlation between the two, which reinforces our interpretation that the 
economic dimension acts as a constraint to the political dimension. 
Table 8 and 9 repeats the same test for the DPEFRs. The main outcome of the ANOVA is 
that there are no significant systematic differences between the DPEFRs, neither along the 
ideological,  nor  along  the  economic  dimension.  The  F  statistics  are  never  statistically 
                                                 
 
5 Incidentally, this result corroborates the impression one gets upon reading the inaugural speeches, 
namely, that they are hard to distinguish, in terms of language and issues raised, along ideological lines.    30 
significant (the p-values are equal to 0.9 for both dimensions). This can be interpreted as 
evidence of erosion of accountability, since apparently some idiosyncratic dimension, other 
than the ideological and economic ones, can distinguish the differences between the DPEFRs. 
The results of the ANOVA for the DPEFRs thus corroborate the findings of the Spearman 
indexes discussed in Section 5.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  have  tried  to  provide  some  empirical  evidence  on  the  degree  of 
consistency between the distributions, along a left-to-right political dimension, of the electoral 
results, of the programmatic speeches of the Governors and of the DPEFRs of the Italian 
Regions for the two legislatures that followed the 1995 institutional reform. We argue that the 
greater  the  degree  of  consistency  among  these  distributions,  the  higher  is  the  Governor’s 
electoral accountability, because changes in the political orientation of the Governor show up 
as a change in the score (and possibly of the relative position) obtained in one of these three 
moments. We have based our interpretation of the left-to-right distribution of the electoral 
results on the evaluation of the ideologies of the Italian regional parties. The methodology for 
content analysis developed by Laver et al. (2003) is instead used to estimate the left-to-right 
distribution of the programmatic speeches and of the ensuing DPEFRs of the Governors of the 
Regions.  
The comparison of the distributions of the Regions in these three moments, performed by 
means of a series of Spearman rank correlation indexes, provides evidence of some erosion of 
electoral  accountability  in  the  passage  from  the  electoral  results  to  the  programmatic 
speeches, namely, right after the Governor is elected. Yet, an even greater erosion occurs 
moving from the speeches to the stage of the DPEFRs, when political decisions begin to take 
shape:  the  distribution  of  the  speeches  and  of  the  DPEFRs  are  not  correlated  in  any 
statistically significant manner. Furthermore, the erosion of accountability seems to become   31 
more  serious  as  time  goes  by  and  appears  to  be  a  fairly  general  phenomenon,  not 
circumscribed to certain areas of the country or specific to certain political coalitions. 
A series of ANOVA tests performed on the distribution of the Regions in the moment of 
the elections and of the inaugural speeches shows that, when these are evaluated according to 
the  dependency  of  the  Region  on  transfers  from  the  Central  Government  and  on  their 
economic conditions, more dependent Regions tend to be governed by Governors who deliver 
more “leftist” discourses. In other words, the economic and financial conditions of the Region 
may explain the erosion of accountability from the moment of the electoral results to that of 
the inaugural speeches. But the same test performed on the DPEFRs shows that neither the 
ideological, nor the economic dimension is able to identify systematic differences between 
these documents, which may be due to some other idiosyncratic factor. This confirms the 
conclusion that the greatest degree of erosion takes place at the stage of the long-term budget 
documents. 
Data  limitations  prevented  us  to  perform  more  systematic  analyses  of  this  erosion  of 
accountability, as well as to extend our inquiry to the pre-electoral stage (the candidates’ 
manifestos) and the first actual decisions, as evidenced by the levels of spending in regional 
programs. These are the most obvious research avenues to pursue in the future.  
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APPENDIX B: LIST, ABBREVIATIONS AND TYPE OF STATUTE OF THE ITALIAN 
REGIONS 
 
N.  AREA  NAME  ABBREVIATION  STATUTE  
1  North  Val d’Aosta  VDA  Special 
2  North  Piemonte  PIE  Ordinary 
3  North  Lombardia  LOM  Ordinary 
4  North  Trentino-Alto Adige  TAA  Special 
5  North  Veneto  VEN  Ordinary 
6  North  Liguria  LIG  Ordinary 
7  North  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  FVG  Special 
8  Center  Emilia Romagna  ERO  Ordinary 
9  Center  Toscana  TOS  Ordinary 
10  Center  Marche  MAR  Ordinary 
11  Center  Umbria  UMB  Ordinary 
12  Center  Lazio  LAZ  Ordinary 
13  Center  Abruzzo  ABR  Ordinary 
14  South  Campania  CAM  Ordinary 
15  South  Molise  MOL  Ordinary 
16  South  Puglia  PUG  Ordinary 
17  South  Basilicata  BAS  Ordinary 
18  South  Calabria  CAL  Ordinary 
19  South  Sicilia  SIC  Special 
20  South  Sardegna  SAR  Special 
 